Them

He has NO answers.
POT-KETTLE-BLACK.

Dale Eastman | Homepage | 03.15.06 - 1:43 pm | #

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/sc...ol=245&page=151

Did Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) state:

In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.
Dale Eastman | Homepage | 03.15.06 - 2:48 pm | #

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/sc...ol=269&page=385

Did Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) state:

That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.

The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.'
Dale Eastman | Homepage | 03.15.06 - 3:25 pm | #

Did McCULLOUGH v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 172 U.S. 102 (1898) state:

It is elementary law that every statute is to be read in the light of the constitution. However broad and general its language, it cannot be interpreted as extending beyond those matters which it was within the constitutional power of the legislature to reach.

So, although general language was introduced into the statute it is not to be read as reaching to matters in respect to which the legislature had no constitutional power, but only as to those matters within its control. And, if there were, as it seems there were, certain special taxes and dues, which, under the existing provisions of the state constitution, could not be affected by legislative action, the statute is to be read as though it in terms excluded them from its operation.
Dale Eastman | Homepage | 03.15.06 - 3:30 pm | #

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/sc...ol=240&page=103

Did STANTON v. BALTIC MINING CO, 240 U.S. 103 (1916) state:
Class B.
Under this class these propositions are relied upon:

(1) That as the 16th Amendment authorizes only an exceptional direct income tax without apportionment, to which the tax in question does not conform, it is therefore not within the authority of that Amendment.

As the first proposition is plainly in conflict with the meaning of the 16th Amendment as interpreted in the Brushaber Case, it may also be put out of view.


But, aside from the obvious error of the proposition, intrinsically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation...

In other words, no direct unapportioned tax.
Dale Eastman | Homepage | 03.15.06 - 3:41 pm | #

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/sc...&vol=240&page=1

Did BRUSHABER v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) state:

We are of opinion, however, that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes.

And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows:

(a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment, and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned.

But it clearly results that the proposition [The "erroneous assumption above] and the contentions under it, if acceded to, WOULD CAUSE ONE PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO DESTROY ANOTHER; that is, they WOULD RESULT IN BRINGING THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT exempting a direct tax from apportionment INTO IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL REQUIREMENT that all direct taxes be apportioned.

Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states.

This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.
Dale Eastman | Homepage | 03.15.06 - 3:49 pm | #