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DO NOT TAKE MY WORD FOR ANYTHING ON THIS PAGE.
Go look it up for yourself.

Them

Brian Rookard - Does what lawyers do best - Part 3

Table of Contents

This page is a continuation from this preceding page.

Now Mr. Rookard, you go ahead and jerk everyone around some more, by ignoring this again:

I am asking for the TENTH (10) time:
25. Admit or deny that:
the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act [of 1909],

Dear reader, I hope by now you are starting to wonder what it is about this specific interrogatory that keeps Mr. Rookard from an honest reply.

As Dale and the other illiterates aptly demonstrate ... they can't understand the difference between VALUE and COST.

Labor has value to you. Your own labor literally cost you nothing.

Failure to understand the difference is the downfall of the TP movement.
Brian Rookard | 03.03.06 - 4:56 pm | #

I decline to give further chase and I decline to follow you off point again.

1. Mr. Eastman is numbering the points.
That way each point is made tangible. Omissions and failures to answer a point are thereby made visible.

2. Mr. Rookard has not challenged Mr. Eastman's assumption that he is a lawyer.
Mr. Rookard did not challenge this statement by Mr. Eastman: "You are alleged to be a Lawyer."
Since Mr. Rookard agrees by silence that he is a lawyer, Mr. Rookard is presumed to be familiar with numbered legal briefs, of which this post takes the form thereof.

3. Mr. Rookard has asserted that "income is NOT [limited to] corporate gain"
Mr. Rookard made this assertion in a prior post:
"The courts are quite clear - your "income is a corporate gain" type argument is a sure loser."

4. Mr. Eastman has asserted (and re-asserts here) that the definition of "income" per the Supreme Court is "corporate gain or profit."

5. The assertions made in 3, 4 just above is the root of this present controversy.
The argument has been about the meaning of the definition of the word "income" as used in the U.S. Constitution, Amendment Sixteen.

6. There is a "succinct definition" of "income" addressed in the Eisner v. Macomber Supreme Court decision.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

... we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case.

7. It is critical to understand "the succinct definition" cited in Eisner in order to determine if a natural person's "compensation for labor" is such "income".

8. Mr. Rookard has chosen to focus on the fact that the Eisner court examined the term "income" as used in common speech and examined the dictionaries in common use in their process of determining the meaning of the term "income" used in the Sixteenth amendment.
Mr. Rookard quoted the Eisner court decision. I have omitted the cites for readability.
Those cites can be elsewhere on a previous page, or at the hyperlinked FindLaw cite.
Emphasis shown is Mr. Rookard's.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.

After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case.

9. Mr. Rookard asserts by implication that the common (dictionary) meaning of income was used in the "succinct definition" cited by the court.
Mr. Rookard asks: "Do we go by the common meaning of the term [income] Dale?"

10. Mr. Eastman asserts: The Eisner court did NOT use the common (dictionary) meaning of income in the "succinct definition" cited by the court.
The Eisner court found "little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909."

Ergo: If the court found "little to add", then the court could ONLY have "added little" if anything to "the succinct definition."

Since the court then cited the definition from the Stratton's decision and it's modification from the Doyle decision, the court in deed, added nothing of the common speech or dictionary meaning to "the succinct definition."

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case.

11. In response to 9, Mr. Eastman asserts: We go by "the succinct definition [of income] adopted in the two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909."

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

... the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case.

Stratton’s Independence, LTD. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913)

And, however the operation shall be described, the transaction is indubitably 'business' within the fair meaning of the act of 1909; and the gains derived from it are properly and strictly the income from that business; for 'income' may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and here we have combined operations of capital and labor.

Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918)

Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.

As was said in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert: 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.'

12. In response to 9, Mr. Eastman asserts: We go by the "definition [of income] , frequently approved by this court".

Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921)

The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909 was not an income tax law, but a definition of the word 'income' was so necessary in its administration that in an early case it was formulated as 'A gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.' Stratton's Independence v. Howbert

This definition, frequently approved by this court, received an addition, in its latest income tax decision, which is especially significant in its application to such a case as we have here, so that it now reads:
'Income may be defined as a gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets.' Eisner v. Macomber

13. In response to 9, Mr. Eastman asserts: "there would seem to be no room to doubt that" we go by "the same meaning [of income] in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it [income] in the Corporation Excise Tax Act."

Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921)

... there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.

14. In response to 9, Mr. Eastman asserts: We go by the meaning of income that "has now become definitely settled by decisions of this [Supreme] Court."

15. In response to 9, and in support of 4, Mr. Eastman asserts: We go by the meaning of income as defined in the 1909 Corporation Excise Tax Act.

16. The controversy expressed in 5 extends to the only meaning of the word "income" that Congress is allowed to use in any and ALL tax acts.
The argument has been about the meaning of the definition of the word "income" as used in the U.S. Constitution, Amendment Sixteen.
Whatever the meaning of "income" in the Sixteenth Amendment, that is the meaning that Congress is limited to in any taxing act.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)

The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted.
...

A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.

In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form.

Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.

17. The Corporate Excise Tax Act definition of "income" is absolutely fatal to the "income is everything that comes in" assertion.
The Corporate Excise Tax Act definition of "income" only applies to "every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares" and which are "engaged in business in any state or territory of the United States"

Stratton’s Independence, LTD. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913)

'I. Does 38 of the act of Congress entitled, 'An Act to Provide Revenue, Equalize Duties, and Encourage the Industries of the United States, and for Other Purposes,' approved August 5, 1909 apply to mining corporations?

'II. Are the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its own premises income within the meaning of the aforementioned act of Congress?
...

It seems to us that the first two questions certified must be answered in the affirmative principally for two reasons. First, because mining corporations are within the general description of 38, which comprises 'every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares , . . . and engaged in business in any state or territory of the United States;'

18. Per 16 above, the Corporate Excise Tax Act definition of "income" is the definition Congress is required to use in any tax act.

Game, Set, Match. You're done Mr. Rookard.

The following is a tying up of loose ends.

19. Mr. Rookard ignores anything that damages Mr. Rookard's position.
It has been Mr. Rookard's M.O. and SOP to ignore things Mr. Rookard finds "inconvenient".
(mo·dus op·er·an·di 1. A method of operating or functioning. 2. A person's manner of working.)
(standard operating procedure: Established procedure to be followed in carrying out a given operation or in a given situation.)

20. Silence can only be equated with fraud.
Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking behavior by the IRS. Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the taxpayer and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government in its enforcement and collection activities." U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932.

21. Since Mr. Rookard defends the IRS in their (illegal) actions, Mr. Rookard is in essence a de facto agent and representative of the IRS.
(de fac·to adj. 2. Actually exercising power though not legally or officially established: a de facto government.)

22. Silence can only be equated with fraud where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.
Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . . We cannot condone this shocking behavior by [Mr. Rookard]. Our revenue system is based on the good faith of the taxpayer and the taxpayers should be able to expect the same from the government [and its de facto representatives] in its [educational,] enforcement and collection activities." U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932.

23. Mr. Rookard has a moral duty to speak.
Mr. Rookard has a moral duty to speak so as to NOT be intentionally misleading to those who read his posts.

24. Mr. Rookard commits fraud with every "inconvenient" point he ignores.

25. A point overlooked ten times is deliberate refusal to address the issue.
In the course of online argument and debate, topics and points can and do get overlooked because one's focus is on another point. However, When a specific point is brought up ten times, and ignored ten times, the omission can only be deliberate.

26. Mr. Rookard has committed 10 acts of fraud by refusing to address a specific point Mr. Rookard finds "inconvenient."
Ten times I have asked Mr. Rookard to admit or deny that:

"the word [income] must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act [of 1909]"

This is a reading comprehension question, since the essense of the point comes directly from the Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka decision.

Thanks Dale.... you prove my point.

I already explained why I will not go down your road of neverending questions.

The reason - it will be neverending ... and you proved it.
Brian Rookard | 03.04.06 - 7:12 pm | #

Mr. Rookard,
I don't care what your reasons are.
The end result is that you won't engage on facts.

Cite: This web page and your non responsive reply.

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