| LEGAL
DISCLAIMER I am not a Tax Lawyer, Nor do I play Dan Evans on the internet. I am not a Certified Public Accountant, Nor do I play Paul Thomas on the internet. I am not an Enrolled Agent, Nor do I play Richard Macdonald on the internet. DO NOT TAKE MY WORD FOR ANYTHING ON THIS PAGE. Go look it up for yourself. |
Shyster1040 v. Dale E. |
| After
goading Shyster1040 by posting the following text, instead of
giving me that "horsewhipping" he promised in the here and now,
Shyster1040 totally ignored his present errors presented to dig
something up out of the archives. <Shrug> It's a response
and it's in the channel I created specifically for debate with
Shyster1040 and it gives me something to work with. In his first attack, he makes the error of thinking I still believe what he is attacking. |
| Incorrectly
asserts that an individual must give a TIN to his customer. http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster.html Promises to "horsewhip" me, but runs away like a coward. http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster2.html Errs on 26 USC 6151 (and a few others.) http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster3.html |
| Geez, Dale, I've got a pretty good
track record if you can only find one mistake (as to TINs). I see THREE links to THREE+ mistakes of yours. And I was working on a fourth when you decided to post in the proper channel to get my attention. With respect to horse-whipping you, let me remind you of the following beating I gave you back on October 27, 2005: I challenged you to do it here and now. You have ignored doing so. I am still waiting for your answer to the question posed on this page: http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster2.html Since you have NOT addressed the question on that page in order to continue THAT debate thereby giving me that horsewhipping in the here and now, I must conclude that you are forfeiting that debate, since you obviously can NOT horsewhip me on demand. (Dear Reader, I'm just a guy who upon learning something is fishy with the tax laws, started studying them. Something truly is fishy about the laws. The more I study, the more I learn over time. That is why "they" don't want to address me in the here and now.) Re: Dale, your only Corporations have income is a loser also. by "Shyster1040" <Shyster1040@nospamhotmail.com> Oct 27, 2005 at 04:12 PM Dale sez:""by Dale Eastman <dalereastman@sprintmail.com> Oct 27, 2005 at 07:22 PM Sorry Mr. Macdonald, These cases you cite, of lower court reversals of the supreme court cases I cite are illegal."" Really Dale, what reversals? The Supreme Court cases you cite (or rather, the cases you've cited and "attempted" to analyse on your too-cute webpage) do not, in any way, shape, or form, stand for the propositions you think they do. There's the assertion Shyster is going to attempt to prove. Problem is, Shyster has NOT been back to those web pages to learn that I have changed them in regard to the error that USED to be on those web pages that he thinks is still there. Merchant's Loan & Trust v. Smietanka - concluded that earlier Supreme Court cases had adopted a uniform definition of "income," which definition was set forth in Eisner v. Macomber as the gain derived from capital, labor, or from both combined, including profit from the sale or exchange of capital assets. That "uniform definition of income" does NOT mean what Shyster1040 thinks it does. This may or may not be presented, depending upon what Shyster1040 has posted for me to work with. Shyster1040 makes the mistake of thinking I read this post when he posted it. I didn't. Now, first point - Mrs. Macomber was, guess what, an individual (or as you like to put it, a natural person). Thus, it must be the case that, as far as the Eisner v. Macomber Court was concerned, the definition of "income" was independent of the nature of the person alleged to have derived that "income." I do hope you will get to the point you are attempting to make with your first point. By the way, Macomber deals with the 1916 tax act. Second point - the very same exact 9 Justices who rendered the decision in Merchant's Loan & Trust also rendered two decisions concerning the taxable income of, can you guess, two individuals, Messers. Walsh and Goodrich. That very same Court applied the same definition in Walsh v. Brewster and Goodrich v. Edwards that it applied in Merchant's Loan & Trust, namely, that income is the gain derived from capital, labor, or from both combined, including profit from the sale or exchange of capital assets. Not only that, but they did so with an explicit cross-reference to Merchant's. I do hope you will get to the point you are attempting to make with your second point. So far, all you have done is post the sequence of words used to define the definition of "INCOME" without addressing the context of their origins which DOES impact their true meaning. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the definition of "income" has any dependence on the nature (corporate or natural) of the person deriving the alleged "income." However, that is EXACTLY the case in regard what was taxable as income in the 1909 tax act. THREE Supreme Court cases and page 2580 of the House Congressional Record of March 27, 1943 make that point. It is from those sources of information that I made my error which has long been corrected on my web site. Nevertheless, YOUR definition is not correct either, I point that I can now prove. (Which explains why you run away from it.) This can be quite easily seen when one actually goes back and reads (and understands) what was going on in Stratton's Independence (from whence the Eisner v. Macomber Court drew its definition of "income," with the addition of the explicit reference to capital assets). <Laughing>. Stratton's case deals with the 1909 tax act definition of "income". The 1909 tax act definition of "income" ONLY applies to corporate receipts. Let's see if you develop that point. The task of the Court in Stratton's Independence was two-fold, first to determine if the plaintiff was a member of the class of persons subject to the tax, and second to determine what the measure of the tax was, primarily to determine if the sale proceeds of the mined ore were included in that measure. Good, good. You have recognized that the 1909 tax act only applies to a certain class of (corporate) persons. (For those new to the issues, "person" as used in law does not mean "human" only. The daily common useage of person does not recognize that a "person" can be a "corporate person" or a "natural person".) These are two analytically distinct issues, namely: (1) Who is being taxed (and is the plaintiff among them)? Good. (You do know you must make the point that only corporate persons are touched by the 1909 tax act if you continue to pursue this line?) (2) What is the amount of the tax based on (and is this particular item included in that base)? Thus, since the class of persons subject to tax in the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 were only corporations engaged in business in the U.S., the Court had to first analyze whether the plaintiff was engaged in business - that is, whether the act of mining gold from your own property was either (a) just the conversion of your own capital from one form to another - and hence not a business because not generating any profits, or (b) the sort of economic activity from which persons engaged in it would expect to obtain a gain on the capital and labor they invested in the activity - and hence "business activity." The Court concluded that because the activity of mining was closely analogous to manufacturing - which was undeniably a "business" - and since people who engage in mining generally expect to earn a profit on it (that is, to derive gain from their investment), the Court concluded that the plaintiff was a corporation engaged in business and thus included in the class of persons subject to the tax. We actually agree on most of what you posted in the above paragraph. However I must call you to task on your error. You stated: "since people who engage in mining generally expect to earn a profit on it (that is, to derive gain from their investment)". Your use of the word "engage" is deceptive. When a Capitalist (2. An investor of capital in business, especially one having a major financial interest in an important enterprise. 3. A person of great wealth) "engages" in mining, he does not "engage" in the physical labor of the mining. The Capitalist does not "work", his money does. When a laborer "engages" in mining, he does the actual physical labor of mining. Other than that, I agree with the rest of what you stated in the above paragraph. (Especially the "derive gain from their investment" statement that is going to bite you when we get to the 16th Amendment definition of "INCOME".) Second, leveraging off of its discussion under the first issue, the Court noted that it had already determined that the activity of mining generally produces, for those engaged in it, gains derived from the capital and labor invested therein, and decided that the sale proceeds of the mined gold was, in fact, the sort of gain that any person engaged in mining would expect to derive. Thus, the sale proceeds were "income" in that they were gains derived from the use of capital and labor in the business of mining. Corporate person "C" owns one half of a mountain and is mining it. Natural Person "N" owns the other half of the mountain and is mining it. Both "C" and "N" are "engaged in mining." Capitalist Investor "I" wholely owns "C", therefore "I" is also "engaged in mining". Only ONE of those entities is taxed by the 1909 tax act. I will continue to develop this point as I address the points you raise below. Notice, in determining whether or not the plaintiff was a member of the class of [CORPORATE] persons taxed, the Court had to determine if it was engaged in business activity, that is, whether it expected to make a profit from the activity, or, put in other words, whether it expected to have "income" from the activity. Your failure to address that the determination of "whether or not the plaintiff was a member of the class of persons taxed" is the determination of "whether or not the plaintiff was a member of the class of [CORPORATE] persons taxed" is again challenged. I would call it legerdemain, but for your use of the word "it". On second thought, you are using legerdemain because the casual reader might not pick up on the use of "IT" instead of him/her/they. Thus, the identification of the class of [CORPORATE] persons taxed, in this case, depends on whether the [CORPORATE] activity engaged in is engaged in for purposes of generating "income" (whether or not any income is actually derived - thus, the analysis is still distinct from the analysis of the measure of the tax). Natural Person "N" mining the other half of the mountain, selling the ore he has mined, is NOT in the class of CORPORATE persons taxed. His proceeds are NOT income per the 1909 tax act. Proof, as found in the Stratton decision, follows. The resulting judgment having been removed by writ of error to the circuit court of appeals, that court certifies that the following questions of law are presented to it, the decision of which is indispensable to a determination of the cause, and upon which it therefore desires the instruction of this court: 'II. Are the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its own premises income within the meaning of the aforementioned act of Congress? The "aforementioned act of Congress" is the 1909 tax act. The Supreme Courts answer to this question: It seems to us that the first two questions certified must be answered in the affirmative principally for two reasons. First, because mining corporations are within the general description of 38, which comprises 'every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares , . . . and engaged in business in any state or territory of the United States;' Let me parse those Supreme Court statements into closer proximity so that you can see the connection: Yes, "the proceeds of ores mined by a CORPORATION" are "income within the meaning of the aforementioned" 1909 tax "act of Congress" "because mining CORPORATIONS are within the general description" of the 1909 tax act "which comprises 'every CORPORATION ... organized for profit, and having a capital stock represented by shares". Natural Person "N" is NOT "within the general description of 38, which comprises 'every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit". Corporate Investor "I" is NOT "within the general description of 38, which comprises 'every corporation, joint stock company, or association organized for profit". I do NOT need to look at the second reason the mining CORPORATION has income from selling its ore, because the second reason deals with CORPORATE exemptions from CORPORATE related laws. Finally, the issue of whether the proceeds were "income" was completely distinct from the nature of both the activity engaged in and the [CORPORATE] person engaging in the activity - so long as a particular item constituted "gain derived from capital, labor, or both" - it was "income." You are confusing the evolved definition of "income" with the 1909 corporate tax act definition of income. Thus, the analysis of the measure of the tax is completely distinct from the analysis of whether or not the plaintiff is a member of the class of [CORPORATE] persons taxed. Since the Supreme Court's words contradict your assertion, I need not address said assertion. You are wrong. In short, the cases you "cite" to do not hold that "income" means only the gain derived by corporations, and thus any subsequent lower court cases are (a) not overruling anything you've cited to, and (b) are in fact applying the cases you cite to for the right reasons. Again, the Supreme Court's words contradict your assertion. And since you are just a dog on the internet, these words from legislative draftsman F. Morse Hubbard carry more weight than your assertions ever will: A most informative statement in regard to the early history of the income tax law was written by Mr. F. Morse Hubbard, formerly of the legislative drafting research fund of Columbia University, and a former legislative draftsman in the Treasury Department. [Pg 2579 House Congressional Record March 27, 1943] The tax imposed by this act was really an income tax in that it was based upon net income, but was given the correct designation of "excise tax". It was imposed with respect to carrying on or doing business; and it should be noted that the basis was net income from all sources, except dividends from other corporations subject to the tax. Such dividends were excepted not because they constituted investment income but because they represented income which had already been taxed. The sole test of taxability under this act was whether a corporation was engaged in business. If it was so engaged, then all the income (except dividends), including investment income, was used in measuring the tax. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the tax was measured by net income, and that income from nontaxable property or property not used in business was included in computing net income, did not prevent the tax from being construed as an excise tax which did not require apportionment. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. et al. (1911) [Pg 2580 House Congressional Record March 27, 1943] Looking solely at the 1909 tax act definition of "income" you are wrong. Moving on to the next post of Shyster 1040 that I never read until I started composing its reply... |