| LEGAL
DISCLAIMER I am not a Tax Lawyer, Nor do I play Dan Evans on the internet. I am not a Certified Public Accountant, Nor do I play Paul Thomas on the internet. I am not an Enrolled Agent, Nor do I play Richard Macdonald on the internet. DO NOT TAKE MY WORD FOR ANYTHING ON THIS PAGE. Go look it up for yourself. |
Shyster1040 v. Dale E. |
| After
goading Shyster1040 by posting the following text, instead of
giving me that "horsewhipping" he promised in the here and now,
Shyster1040 totally ignored his present errors presented to dig
something up out of the archives. <Shrug> It's a response
and it's in the channel I created specifically for debate with
Shyster1040 and it gives me something to work with. In his third attack, Shyster1040 posts much in agreement with me. (Can I call it an attack when he posts points supporting my position?) |
| Incorrectly
asserts that an individual must give a TIN to his customer. http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster.html Promises to "horsewhip" me, but runs away like a coward. http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster2.html Errs on 26 USC 6151 (and a few others.) http://www.synapticsparks.info/them/shyster3.html |
| Or, this one, from a different
thread, on February 14, 2005: Re: Best information from www.paynotaxes.org by "Shyster1040" <Shyster1040@nospamhotmail.com> Feb 14, 2005 at 01:04 PM Sorry, monkey-boy, but that ain't the way it works. Sigh.... Sticks and stones... Congress may impose any tax it wishes; if the tax is classified as an impost, duty or excise, then it must be applied with geographically uniform rates; if the tax is a so-called "direct tax," then, subject to the 16th Amendment, it must be apportioned on the basis of the census. Basically, there is nothing to argue with in that assertion. Neither is there a point presented as refutation of any point of mine. And neither is any point of mine presented, which is to be refuted. More to the point, no court, no legislature, and no rational commentator (you do not count, for very obvious reasons) has ever suggested that the income tax was not a permissible tax. It has always been a permissible tax; the only issue in the Income Tax cases was whether or not it had to be directly apportioned. The Supreme Court said that any tax on the income from property was a tax on the property itself and therefore a direct tax (notice, dimbulb, they never once talked about the tax on wages). The 16th Amendment promptly overruled the Income Tax cases, with the result that Congress can (as it always could) enact an income tax, and now it is beyond cavil that such a tax is never subject to the direct apportionment requirements. Your insults speak to your character, not mine. An assertion without proof may be refuted without proof. Only a tax on Sixteenth Amendment "INCOME" (gain from invested property) is "never subject to the direct apportionment requirements". I will type slow and use small words, when I address this point more fully below. Finally, if you would, just for once, read the damned cases you continually regurgitate here, you would see that they dealt with the direct/indirect issue by holding that the income tax was taken out of the direct category (whether or not it ever was really in there was immaterial) and placed into the category of indirect taxes, meaning that the only limitation on it is that it must be applied with uniform rates. An assertion without proof may be refuted without proof. You are wrong. The OTHER "limitation" of the direct/indirect issue of the "income" tax, is the proper Sixteenth Amendment definition of "INCOME" to which the Sixteenth Amendment rejection of apportionment applies. I will type slow and use small words, when I address this point more fully below. Your drivel about "is it a privilege or is it a right" is meaningless tripe. An assertion without proof may be refuted without proof. You are wrong. A tax on income has always been, ever since the beginning of recorded English history, a valid tax (and a direct tax at that); it continued to be a valid tax under the Constitution in 1789, and was only subject to the apportionment requirement. Finally... You are coming to your senses and agreeing with what I have been saying all along. Except that you mis-state what the Pollock Court said on this issue. The Court quoted this: "Mr. Hamilton also argued: 'If the meaning of the word 'excise' is to be sought in a British statute, it will be found to include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an 'excise.' ... An argument results from this, though not perhaps a conclusive one, yet, where so important a distinction in the constitution is to be realized, it is fair to seek the meaning of terms in the statutory language of that country from which our jurisprudence is derived.' 7 Hamilton's Works (Lodge's Ed.) 333. If the question had related to an income tax, the reference would have been fatal, as such taxes have been always classed by the law of Great Britain as direct taxes." The Court also quoted this: "Albert Gallatin, in his Sketch of the Finances of the United States, published in November, 1796, said: 'The most generally received opinion, however, is that, by direct taxes in the constitution, those are meant which are raised on the capital or revenue of the people; by indirect, such as are raised on their expense." A tax on the people's revenue is a direct tax. A tax on this revenue, prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, could only be laid, subject to apportionment. In a summary, the Pollock court said: " From the foregoing it is apparent (1) that the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of the constitution and those who adopted it; (2) that, under the state system of taxation, all taxes on real estate or personal property or the rents or income thereof were regarded as direct taxes; (3) that the rules of apportionment and of uniformity were adopted in view of that distinction and those systems; (4) that whether the tax on carriages was direct or indirect was disputed, but the tax was sustained as a tax on the use and an excise; (5) that the original expectation was that the power of DIRECT TAXATION WOULD BE EXERCISED ONLY IN EXTRAORDINARY EXIGENCIES; and down to August 15, 1894, this expectation has been realized." That requirement was lifted with the 16th Amendment. Therefore, incomes can be taxed, as they always could, but the only restriction on the tax is that it be applied with uniform rates. An assertion without proof may be refuted without proof. You are wrong. Nevertheless, the proof that you are wrong now follows. You are using sophistry (1. Plausible but fallacious argumentation. 2. A plausible but misleading or fallacious argument) to make your point. As I stated above in my choice of words, which your choice of words agreed with: "A tax on the people's revenue is a direct tax. A tax on this revenue, prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, required apportionment." Your statement, "Therefore, incomes can be taxed" [without apportionment], is only correct if the "INCOME" being taxed is SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT INCOME, also called CONSTITUTIONAL INCOME. Your sophistry is that you inject the "everything that comes in" meaning of "income" in place of the "Sixteenth Amendment Income" which will be made clear below. U.S. Supreme Court EISNER v. MACOMBER , 252 U.S. 189 (1920) This case presents the question whether, by virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to tax, as income of the stockholder and without apportionment, a stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith against profits accumulated by the corporation since March 1, 1913. It arises under the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, which, in our opinion, ... plainly evinces the purpose of Congress to tax stock dividends as income. In Towne v. Eisner, ... under the Act of October 3, 1913... The court treated the construction of the act as inseparable from the interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment; and, having referred to Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., and quoted the Amendment, proceeded very properly to say: 'It is manifest that the stock dividend in question cannot be reached by the Income Tax Act and could not, even though Congress expressly declared it to be taxable as income, unless it is in fact income.' KEY POINT: Regardless of what Congress "expressly" declares taxable as income, such a thing can NOT "be taxable as income, unless it is in fact income." E. v. M.: Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the matter, and the fact that Congress in the Revenue Act of 1916 declared (39 Stat. 757 [Comp. St . 6336b]) that a 'stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value,' we will deal at length with the constitutional question, incidentally testing the soundness of our previous conclusion. The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., under the Act of August 27, 1894, it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, imposed by reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such taxes without apportioning them among the states according to population, as required by article 1, 2, cl. 3, and section 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution. KEY POINT: Rents and profits of real estate and returns from investments of personal property are the items which Pollock ruled on. KEY POINT: Not just once, but twice, the Constitution orders that direct taxes be apportioned. E. v. M.: Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished: KEY POINT: The Pollock ruling was a LIMITATION of Congress' taxing power. KEY POINT: This limitation was upon Congress' ability to tax rents and profits of real estate and returns from investments of personal property without apportionment. KEY POINT: Removing the limitation of Congress' ability to tax rents and profits of real estate and returns from investments of personal property without apportionment was the object to be accomplished. E. v. M.: 'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on INCOMES, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.' As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on INCOME. REMINDER: Regardless of what Congress "expressly" declares taxable as income, such a thing can NOT "be taxable as income, unless it is in fact income." E. v. M.: A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to INCOME, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. REMINDER: Regardless of what Congress "expressly" declares taxable as income, such a thing can NOT "be taxable as income, unless it is in fact income." E. v. M.: This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts. KEY POINT: The Constitutional limitation that direct taxes be apportioned is NOT repealed by the Sixteenth Amendment. E. v. M.: In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. KEY POINT: The clauses (2) cited from article 1 of the Constitution REQUIRE apportionment of direct taxes. KEY POINT: If an item is not INCOME as it is used in the Sixteenth Amendment, then the rule of apportionment STILL APPLIES. REMINDER: Regardless of what Congress "expressly" declares taxable as income, such a thing can NOT "be taxable as income, unless it is in fact income." E. v. M.: Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised. KEY POINT: Congress cannot define or change what Sixteenth Amendment INCOME is by legislation because such a definition is a Constitutional definition. E. v. M.: The fundamental relation of 'capital' to 'income' has been much discussed by economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the latter to the fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time. For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'INCOME,' as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue. KEY POINT: The definition as used in common speech IS the common speech of 1909-1913 when the amendment was presented for ratification. E. v. M.: After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.), COMMENT: This period "common use" was argued against me by another adversary. My adversary of that moment provided a link to a period dictionary. Those dictionary definitions support the Tax Honesty Movement. COMMENT: The Supreme Court found little to add to the succinct definition. In other words, the definition that follows is THE definition THIS court is going to explain. E. v. M.: 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case. COMMENT: The link to the period dictionaries allowed me to look up more than just the period usage of the word "Income". "Gain" and "Profit" are quite interesting also. The dictionaries are of no matter, because THIS court case lays out what Sixteenth Amendment Income actually is. E. v. M.: Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. 'Derived-from- capital'; 'the gain-derived-from-capital,' etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'-that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal- that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description. KEY POINT: "INCOME" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment, is gain or profit proceding from the INVESTED property. In other words: Sixteenth Amendment INCOME is the Return On Investment, SEVERED from the invested property. KEY POINT: This definition is to be examined in the light of what the Pollock case removed from Congress' reach, which the Sixteenth Amendment returned to Congress' reach: KEY POINT: "NOTHING ELSE ANSWERS THE DESCRIPTION." "Rents and profits of real estate and returns from investments of personal property" - "that is income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description." SUMMARY: 1. A tax on the people's revenue is a direct tax. 2. A tax on this revenue, prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, could only be laid, subject to apportionment. 3. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on [Sixteeth Amendment] INCOMES, from whatever source derived, without apportionment... 4. The Sixteenth Amendment "shall not be modified or extended by loose construction." 5. The purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to allow Congress to tax "rents and profits of real estate and returns from investments of personal property". 6. "Rents and profits of real estate and returns from investments of personal property" are all Returns On Investments (ROI's) 7. When the ROI is severed from the capital, it is Sixteenth Amendment Income. 8. The people's revenue from exchanging labor (property) for money (property) or other forms of property is "compensation for labor". 9. Compensation for labor, or payroll revenue is NOT Sixteenth Amendment Income. 10. The requirement of apportionment "still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts." 11. A tax on the people's revenue is STILL a direct tax and STILL requires apportionment. |